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What One Hand Giveth, The Other 
Taketh Away: How Future 
Dangerousness Corrupts Guilt Verdicts 
and Produces Premature Punishment 
Decisions in Capital Cases 
 
Elizabeth S. Vartkessian
*
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Contemporary death penalty trials are conducted in two parts—the 
first to determine a defendant’s guilt and, if they are found guilty, the 
second to decide the punishment—in order to ensure that penalty 
considerations are made separate from guilt decisions. The widespread 
adoption of bifurcating capital trials into two phases followed the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 which found the 
administration of the death penalty unconstitutionally arbitrary and 
possibly discriminatory under then prevailing statutes. Prior to Furman, 
most states with capital punishment conducted unitary proceedings 
during which the defendant’s guilt and penalty were determined 
concurrently.
2
 However, in addition to placing defendants in the 
challenging position of arguing against their guilt while also arguing for 
a sentence less than death, unitary trials risked preventing jurors from 
 
  * Elizabeth Vartkessian is a visiting researcher at the University at Albany School of 
Criminal Justice. She received her Ph.D. in Law from the University of Oxford. Dr. 
Vartkessian is the primary researcher for the third round of data collection for the Capital 
Jury Project in Texas. The Author would like to thank Dr. William Bowers, Jonathan 
Kerr, James Marcus, Sean O’Brien, Christopher Kelly, Gilly Ross, and Aimee Solway 
who reviewed drafts and offered a number of helpful suggestions. A draft of this Article 
was presented to members of the University at Albany School of Criminal Justice. The 
data collection was supported by the National Science Foundation (SES-0520487). 
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
        2.  Prior to the Court’s decision in Furman, some states, such as New York, 
Pennsylvania, and California, had changed their capital sentencing statutes to reflect the 
growing belief that bifurcated trials would provide additional safeguards to capital 
defendants absent in a unitary proceeding. See Gerhard Mueller & Douglas Besharov, 
Bifurcation: The Two Phase System of Criminal Procedure in the United States, 15 
WAYNE L. REV. 613 (1968). 
1
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being given complete access to the most relevant evidence available with 
respect to sentencing.
3
 Amidst growing concerns that such trials 
permitted an unlawful amount of arbitrariness in the penalty decision, the 
Supreme Court delivered their judgment in Furman, signaling the end of 
unitary capital trials and unfettered discretion in capital sentencing. 
Yet, it was the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia and its 
companion cases that cemented the role of bifurcation in modern capital 
sentencing.
4
 In response to the Court’s decision thirty-five states passed 
new death penalty statutes designed to remedy the arbitrariness found in 
Furman.
5
 These newly drafted statutes fell into two broad categories: 
those that maintained a unitary trial and sought to eliminate arbitrariness 
in sentencing by automatically making the death penalty mandatory upon 
conviction of a capital crime
6
 and those that provided sentencing 
guidelines to jurors in a second phase of the trial.
7
 Gregg and its 
progeny
8
 determined that statutes which did not attempt to provide the 
 
        3.  The Court acknowledged as much in its reliance on the American Law Institute’s 
justification for a two-phase capital trial: “[If a unitary proceeding is used] the 
determination of the punishment must be based on less than all the evidence that has a 
bearing on that issue, such as a previous criminal record of the accused, or evidence must 
be admitted on the ground that it is relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as 
irrelevant or prejudicial with respect to guilt or innocence alone. Trial lawyers 
understandably have little confidence in a solution that admits the evidence and trusts to 
an instruction to the jury that it should be considered only in determining the penalty and 
disregarded in assessing guilt. . . . The obvious solution is to bifurcate the proceeding, 
abiding strictly by the rules of evidence until and unless there is a conviction, but once 
guilt has been determined opening the record to the further information that is relevant to 
sentence.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976). Although the American Law 
Institute endorsed the changes brought about by Furman to capital sentencing statutes, 
the Institute revised its position in 2009 withdrawing its support of the death penalty. See 
Adam Liptak, Group Gives Up Death Penalty Work, N.Y. TIMES, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/us/05bar.html; Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, 
Report of the Council to the Membership of the American Law Institute on the Matter of 
the Death Penalty, April 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/alicoun.pdf.   
       4.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
5. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive 
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 
143, 145 (1986). 
       6.  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325 (1976). 
       7. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).  
8. See cases cited supra note 4. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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sentencer an opportunity to make an individualized assessment of 
punishment separate from the guilt decision would be unconstitutional, 
but that “guided-discretion” statutes that attempted to safeguard the 
punishment decision through bifurcation and by providing jurors with 
factors to consider at sentencing would pass constitutional muster.
9
 
Of the three guided-discretion statutes to pass muster with the 
Court, the Texas scheme was most unique in its formulation of 
sentencing factors.
10
 Whereas the approved statutes in Georgia
11
 and 
Florida
12
 identified statutory aggravating and mitigating factors for jurors 
to consider and provided instruction as to how they should approach their 
sentencing decision, the Texas statute restricted the jury’s sentencing 
concerns to three “special issue questions.”13 Although the Texas capital 
sentencing scheme has been amended by the legislature since the Court 
initially approved it in 1976,
14
 both the first and subsequent iterations of 
 
9.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). These statutes also provided some type of 
automatic appellate review after conviction. 
10. See cases cited supra note 7. 
11. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. The Georgia statute limited death eligible 
crimes to six categories, instructed the jury to hear additional evidence in mitigation and 
aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions or the 
absence of any prior conviction and pleas, and required the jury to find at least one 
statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before electing to impose death. 
12. See generally Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242. The Florida statute also limited capital 
punishment to a smaller classification of crimes and required the jury to consider whether 
sufficient mitigating circumstances existed which outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances found to exist. Based on the weighing of factors the jury was to 
recommend either a death sentence or life sentence to the judge. 
13. The originally approved special issue questions were: 
 
(1) [W]hether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of 
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society; and 
 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in 
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, 
if any, by the deceased. 
 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.0711, § 3(b) (West 2009). 
14. The change to the Texas capital sentencing statute was prompted by the 
3
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the special issue questions have made a determination of the defendant’s 
future dangerousness the centerpiece of the sentencing decision.
15
 
Future dangerousness is a statutory aggravating factor in four other 
states,
16
 and a permissible non-statutory aggravating factor in twelve (as 
well as in the federal capital sentencing statute).
17
 However, the Texas 
 
Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, in which concerns were raised about the 
statute’s ability to provide the jury with a mechanism for endorsing some types of 
evidence as mitigating. In Penry, the Court stressed that jurors needed to engage in a 
reasoned moral decision when determining a capital defendant’s sentence. It concluded 
that the original statute was incapable of facilitating this requirement in certain cases, 
focusing on the fact that some types of mitigating evidence might be simultaneously 
viewed as evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness. For instance, Penry’s 
evidence of mental retardation and experiences of victimization might render him less 
morally blameworthy, but also indicate his inability to learn from mistakes. Thus, without 
a special issue question addressing mitigating factors, jurors who wished to give 
mitigating effect to his evidence would not have been able to do so. Although the 
legislature changed the questions—removing the first special issue question concerning 
the deliberateness of the capital murder and adding a question addressing mitigating 
factors—the basic structure of the scheme remained. 
15. Previous research has shown that Texas capital jurors believe that the answer to 
the future dangerousness special issue question is directly linked to the defendant’s 
sentence. Nearly 70 percent of jurors in Texas stated that a death sentence was required if 
the defendant was shown to be a future danger. See William J. Bowers and Wanda D. 
Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to Purge Arbitariness from Capital 
Sentencing, 39 CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 51 (2003). Texas capital jurors were twice as 
likely as jurors in other states to hold this mistaken belief. Research conducted 
approximately fifteen years later posed the same questions to capital jurors in Texas and 
found a consistent percentage of jurors continued to maintain this false belief. See 
Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, Dangerously Biased: How the Texas Capital Sentencing Statue 
Encourages Jurors to be Unreceptive to Mitigating Evidence, 29 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 237 
(2011). Furthermore, a current research project shows that capital jurors who deliberated 
under the original and amended capital statutes in Texas held nearly identical views 
regarding whether a death sentence was required if a defendant was shown to be a future 
danger—69.5 vs. 69.6 percent respectively. See Elizabeth S. Vartkessian and Christopher 
E. Kelly, The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same: An Analysis of Juror 
Decision-Making in Texas Death Penalty Trials (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Author). 
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2(1) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) 
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) 
(2002). 
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2006) (“The jury . . . may consider whether any other 
aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.”); Arthur v. State, 575 So. 2d 
1165, 1185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171, 1217 (Cal. 1999); 
Walker v. State, 327 S.E.2d 475, 484 (Ga. 1985); State v. Welcome, 458 So. 2d 1235, 
1256 (La. 1984); State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 543-44 (Mo. 2010); State v. Smith, 705 
P.2d 1087, 1103-1105 (Mont. 1985); Redmen v. State, 828 P.2d 395, 400 (Nev. 1992), 
overruled on other grounds by Alford v. State, 906 P.2d 714 (Nev. 1995); State v. Steen, 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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and Oregon statutes are the only two states which require the jury to 
make such a determination.
18
 Though jurors are instructed to determine 
the defendant’s dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, they do not 
receive any additional statutory guidance for determining the defendant’s 
future dangerousness. 
Both the unusual sentencing requirement that jurors determine the 
defendant’s dangerousness and the relative lack of statutory guidance 
provided to the jury in order to reach a decision is especially important in 
light of the extant literature regarding predictions of future 
dangerousness. Research indicates that projections of a defendant’s 
dangerousness are poor predictions of whether or not a defendant will 
actually commit future acts of violence.
19
 Research also indicates that 
mental health professionals who hold themselves out as future 
dangerousness “experts” are often inaccurate in their assessments.20 The 
American Psychological Association (APA) itself recognized that, even 
under the best circumstances, predictions of future dangerousness by 
their own colleagues are inaccurate in two out of every three cases.
21
 
Moreover, research shows that jurors’ predictions of future 
dangerousness are equally mistaken and that jurors tend to automatically 
err in the direction of finding future dangerousness when faced with 
answering the special issue question.
22
 
 
536 S.E.2d 1, 30-31 (N.C. 2000); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 280 (Ohio 1988); 
Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 750 A.2d 243, 253-54 (Pa. 2000); State v. Young, 459 
S.E.2d 84, 87 (S.C. 1995); State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 759 (Utah 2003). 
18. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(A)–(D) (2009); See William W. Berry III, 
Ending Death by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 894 (2010). Four additional states—Idaho, Virginia, Oklahoma, 
and Wyoming—identify the defendant’s future dangerousness as a statutory aggravating 
factor. As one commentator noted, the six states which direct the jury to consider the 
defendant’s future danger accounts for over 50 percent of executions in the post-Furman 
era. Id. 
19. See Mark Douglas Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Capital Offenders in Texas 
Prisons: Rates, Correlates, and an Actuarial Analysis of Violent Misconduct, 31 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 553 (2007); Mark D. Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Improbable 
Predictions at Capital Sentencing: Contrasting Prison Violence Outcomes, 38 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 61 (2010); Mark D. Cunningham et al, Capital Jury Decision-
Making: The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 223 (2009). 
20. See Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 3, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080), 
available at http://www.psych.org/lib_archives/archives/amicus_1982_barefoot.pdf. 
21. Id. 
22. See James W. Marquart et al, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors 
5
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In addition to the likelihood that trained professionals and juries are 
often incorrect in determining a defendant’s dangerousness, another 
concern also emerges from the statute’s emphasis on future 
dangerousness. In a capital case, jurors go through the process of “death-
qualification” during jury selection or voir dire23 and are questioned 
about their ability to impose a sentence of death.
24
 Previous research 
shows that the experience of death-qualification itself will affect jurors’ 
perceptions of the guilt and punishment phase evidence.
25
 Moreover, 
death-qualification necessitates that potential jurors learn about their 
state’s sentencing statute in order to determine whether the juror is able 
to follow the applicable law in the case. Commentators have noted that 
the capital trial—especially the punishment decision—is unlike any 
other.
26
 The Supreme Court itself noted that a “capital sentencing jury is 
made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called 
on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice.”27 Due to their 
lack of expertise and limited experience in understanding the legal 
requirements for determining the defendant’s guilt and punishment, 
jurors will tend to place great value on the explanations they are provided 
during jury selection.
28
  
Thus, in Texas, through the process of death-qualification jurors 
will learn about the requirement that they decide the defendant’s future 
dangerousness at jury selection and be provided examples of evidence 
which may assist them in resolving an answer to this special issue 
question. As shown in this Article, during voir dire jurors are often 
informed that they may use the evidence presented in the guilt phase as 
 
Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449 (1989). 
23. Voir dire is a phrase commonly used when describing jury selection and refers 
to an oath to tell the truth. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009). 
24. See Craig Haney et al, “Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing 
Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619 (1994). 
        25.  See Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the 
Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984); Craig Haney, On the Selection of 
Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 121 (1984). 
       26. See generally Craig Haney et al, Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, 
Sentencing Instructions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES, 149 (1994). 
       27.  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985). 
        28.   In Texas, since the special issue questions contain a number of words which are 
left statutorily undefined, legal actors are able to provide jurors with a wide range of 
examples which shape their interpretation of the special issue questions. See Elizabeth S. 
Vartkessian, Dangerously Biased: How the Texas Capital Sentencing Statue Encourages 
Jurors to be Unreceptive to Mitigating Evidence, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 237 (2011). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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the sole determining factor in deciding whether the defendant is a future 
danger. What therefore is the effect of exposing jurors to the future 
dangerousness special issue question during jury selection? Are there 
implications for jurors’ culpability and punishment decisions which may 
undermine the Court’s requirements that the sentencing decision be made 
separately after receiving all available evidence about the defendant’s 
background, character, and the crime in order to come to a reasoned 
moral judgment? By focusing on the statutory requirement that jurors 
determine the defendant’s future dangerousness we may therefore be 
able to better understand the capital sentencing process within America’s 
busiest death penalty state.  
 
A. Why Focus on Texas? 
 
Texas utilizes capital punishment more frequently than most other 
states. In addition to Texas’ unmatched record of executions since capital 
punishment resumed in 1976
29
 it is probable that capital defendants in 
Texas are also more likely to receive a death sentence if their case 
proceeds to the punishment phase of trial than defendants in other states. 
Historically, once convicted, between 75-80 percent of capital defendants 
in Texas have been sentenced to death.
30
 It has been suggested that 
jurisdictions such as California experience closer to a 50 percent return 
of death verdicts from capital trials.
31
Although the data are incomplete 
on this last point with respect to death sentencing rates in Texas and 
those of other states in more recent times, available data suggests the 
continuation of this trend.
32
 
 
       29.  Texas has accounted for 464 of the 1,234 executions carried out since the death 
penalty was reinstated. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2010: YEAR 
END REPORT 1 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2010YearEnd-Final.pdf, 
       30.  Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-
Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC. CHANGE 743, 
772 (1990-91) (showing that capital juries returned death sentences in 77 percent of all 
cases between 1974-1988).  
       31.  See Brent Newton, A Case Study in Systematic Unfairness: The Texas Death 
Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 7 n.38 (1993); DAVID BALDUS ET AL., 
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 233 
(1990). These authors provide death sentencing rates both prior to, and after, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia and indicate death sentencing rates in Georgia 
after Furman to be 55 percent. Other jurisdictions showed similar rates. Id. 
       32. The sample of cases included in the current study was drawn during an eighteen-
month period ranging from 2006 to 2008. During that time seventeen capital cases were 
7
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Recent developments in other states also signal a greater divide 
between Texas’ enthusiasm for capital punishment and the rest of 
America. New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, and most recently 
Connecticut have each legislatively abolished the death penalty.
33
 Repeal 
legislation has been introduced in Kansas, Maryland, Colorado, New 
Hampshire, Nebraska, and Washington.
34
 In some instances such 
measures failed by a single vote.
35
 Public opinion appears to be roughly 
split between those supporting the death penalty and those who prefer 
life without the opportunity for parole (LWOP) as a punishment for 
murder.
36
 The number of exonerations from death row continues to 
grow
37
 and yet, even with recently discovered evidence in several Texas 
 
tried. One trial ended in a hung jury at the guilt phase, twelve resulted in death sentences, 
and the remainder resulted in sentences of LWOP which is consistent with an 80 percent 
rate of receiving a death sentence at trial.  
33. Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html; New Mexico 
Abolishes Death Penalty, CBS NEWS (Mar. 18, 2009, 9:05 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/18/national/main4874296.shtml; Ariane de 
Vogue & Barbara Pinto, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty; 16th State to End 
Executions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/illinois-16th-
state-abolish-death-penalty/story?id=13095912.; David Ariosto, Connecticut Becomes the 
17th State to Abolish Death Penalty, CNN JUSTICE (Apr. 25, 2012), available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-04-25/justice/justice_connecticut-death-penalty-law-
repealed_1_capital-punishment-death-penalty-information-center-death-
sentences?_s=PM:JUSTICE. 
34. See Alice Popovici, Maryland Considers Death Penalty Repeal, NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REP. (Feb. 27, 2009), http://ncronline.org/news/justice/maryland-considers-
death-penalty-repeal (“Bills seeking to repeal the death penalty have been introduced in 
Nebraska, Colorado, New Hampshire, Washington and Kansas.”). For a summary of 
recent legislative activity regarding capital punishment see the Death Penalty Information 
Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity. 
35. Jessica Fender & Lynn Bartels, Bid to Repeal Death Penalty Fails in Senate, 
DENVER POST, May 6, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12307296 (noting that the 
legislation failed to pass in the Colorado Senate by a vote of eighteen to seventeen). 
36. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx 
(last updated Mar. 9, 2012, 1:00 PM) (polls also indicate similar splits in preference when 
respondents are asked whether they prefer the death penalty or life without the 
opportunity for parole for a convicted murderer); Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
Poll Shows Growing Support for Alternatives to the Death Penalty; Capital Punishment 
Ranked Lowest Among Budget Priorities (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pollresults (one poll shows that those interviewed 
preferred life without the opportunity for parole plus restitution for victim survivors more 
than the death penalty—only thirty-three percent of respondents said that they preferred 
the death penalty as opposed to other sentencing options).  
37. Innocence and Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last updated Feb. 7, 2012) 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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cases which strongly suggests that the state has executed an innocent 
person,
38
 the use of capital punishment there continues. 
Scholars have offered a number of valid and useful theories for 
understanding the disproportionate use of capital punishment in Texas. 
Some have suggested the anomaly is due to historically-rooted cultural 
values of vigilantism.
39
 Others argue that it is a coincidence of legal and 
political happenstance.
40
 Many members of the public perceive the 
Supreme Court’s consistent involvement in death penalty cases as a sign 
 
(140 death row exonerations have occurred since 1973—of those, twelve are from 
Texas). As regards future dangerousness, the inescapable conclusion from these 
exonerations is that jurors in these twelve Texas cases found that men who had never 
killed would nevertheless kill in the future. 
38.  See James S. Liebman, Shawn Crowley, Andrew Markquart, Lauren 
Rosenberg, Lauren Gallo White, & Daniel Zharkovsky, Los Tocayos Carlos 43 COLUM. 
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. (2012). Carlos DeLuna was executed by the state of Texas in 
1989. The authors present evidence that they uncovered demonstrating that DeLuna, a 
poor Hispanic man with childlike intellect, was innocent. The book length monograph 
and multimedia presentation of the evidence can be found at, 
http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/ltc/. See also David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas 
Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact 
_grann. Cameron Todd Willingham was executed in 2004 for the deaths of his children in 
a house fire and maintained his innocence until his death. Id. He was convicted with 
questionable evidence from an arson expert. Id. Importantly, other experts versed in the 
best scientific practices of arson investigation have strenuously argued that the fire was 
accidental and likely caused by a space heater or faulty electrical wiring. Id. See also 
David Mann, DNA Tests Undermine Evidence in Texas: New Results Shows that Claude 
Jones was put to Death on Flawed Evidence, TEXAS OBSERVER (Nov. 11, 2010), 
http://www.texasobserver.org/cover-story/texas-observer-exclusive-dna-tests-undermine-
evidence-in-texas-execution (illustrating problems with forensic evidence in that new 
DNA evidence has shown that a strand of hair—the only evidence placing Jones at the 
murder—has no connection to the executed man). The inescapable conclusion in these 
numerous Texas cases is that jurors that found that men who had never killed would 
nevertheless kill in the future. 
39. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 90 (2003) (Zimring argues that there is a distinct relationship between areas 
in America which witnessed high numbers of lynchings and those which are leaders in 
the use of death sentencing and executions). See also James W. Marquart, Sheldon 
Ekland-Olson and Jonathan R. Sorensen, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR AND THE NEEDLE (1994). 
This is especially true of counties within East Texas which had the highest concentrations 
of slaves within the state, the most active occurrences of lynchings, and subsequently 
account for the greatest number of death sentences and executions. 
40. See David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT 
& SOC'Y 347, 350 (2005) (asserting that the death penalty is a recent development, which 
resulted from legal and political decisions rather than any deep rooted value-system or 
culture). 
9
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that the system is functioning appropriately, as opposed to an indication 
that something is fundamentally wrong. Thus, it is the Court’s repeated 
and failed attempts to “fix” the death penalty that may be inhibiting the 
momentum for abolition. Finally, the death penalty has remained a 
heavily politicized issue in Texas. In particular, it is likely that Texas’ 
practice of electing partisan judges at both the trial and appellate levels 
contributes to the inordinate use of the death penalty in that state.
41
 The 
cultural, historical, and political arguments offered by others provide a 
meta-narrative. However, these arguments fail to recognize the unique 
dynamic occurring in Texas trial courts, in large part due to the unusual 
sentencing scheme. In this Article, I advance the theoretical debate about 
the continued use of capital punishment in Texas by demonstrating that 
the sentencing scheme’s focus on the defendant’s future dangerousness 
and its treatment of this issue during voir dire bear much of the 
responsibility for the resultant death sentences within Texas. 
In order to examine how jurors’ early exposure to the concept of the 
defendant’s future dangerousness influences guilty verdicts and early 
punishment decisions, I present recently collected data from the Capital 
Jury Project (CJP).
42
 The CJP is a consortium of university-based 
researchers who administer an interviewing instrument with participating 
capital jurors from around the country. One of the main aims of the 
CJP’s research is to investigate whether capital jurors arrive at their 
sentencing decision in a manner consistent with the dictates of the 
Supreme Court and their state’s capital sentencing scheme. In the more 
recent data collection efforts, importance has also been placed on 
collecting the trial transcripts in the cases in which the interviewed jurors 
participated.
43
 Thus, the data presented in this Article come from two 
sources: transcripts from eight capital trials conducted in Texas
44
 and 
 
41. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN 
AGE OF ABOLITION 48 (2010) (“Judicial elections take place in thirty-one out of thirty-five 
death penalty states, and judges have sometimes been deselected because their capital 
appeals decisions were out of line with the views of their constituents.”). See also 
Stephen Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Federal 
Habeas Corpus Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1806, 1808 (2000). 
42. Capital Jury Project, SCH. CRIM. JUST., U. ALBANY, ST. U. OF N.Y., 
http://www.albany.edu/scj/capital_jury_project.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
43. See id. 
44.  In 2005 the Texas capital statute changed the alternative to a death sentence 
from life with parole eligibility in forty years to LWOP. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2009). In order for the data to be sensitive to that change the 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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data from semi-structured in-person interviews with forty-six 
deliberating jurors from those eight trials.
45
 The in-person interviews 
were all conducted with the study-wide survey instrument, which 
contained a mixture of fixed-choice and open-ended questions that traced 
jurors’ experiences throughout the trial process.46 
Since jurors are provided a framework understanding of the 
sentencing statute during jury selection, I first look at how jurors are 
introduced to the concept of the defendant’s dangerousness during that 
process. In particular, I outline the manner in which jurors are 
encouraged to think about how the guilt phase evidence relates to the 
defendant’s dangerousness. Section two then provides a general sketch of 
the evidence presented during the guilt phase in the eight trials included 
in this study which jurors deemed most significant during guilt 
deliberations. Sections three and four examine jurors’ guilt phase 
deliberations and evaluate jurors’ tendency to use guilt phase evidence to 
reach a premature punishment decision. Section five discusses the 
constitutional implications of allowing an assessment of the defendant’s 
future dangerousness to be given such a central role in the sentencing 
determination. In this Section I suggest that early exposure to the 
sentencing scheme results in jurors interpreting the guilt phase evidence 
as evidence of the defendant’s dangerousness and therefore undermines 
their ability to suspend judgment with respect to the defendant’s 
sentence. Thus, I consider some ways in which the operation of 
bifurcation may be maintained in Texas. 
 
 
 
sample was restricted to cases in which the defendant was tried under the most recent 
statute. Even numbers of trials which resulted in a death sentence and those which 
resulted in a sentence of LWOP were included in the sample. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2011). 
45. The Author interviewed twenty-four jurors who deliberated in cases which 
resulted in a sentence of death and twenty-two jurors who deliberated in cases which 
resulted in LWOP. 
46. ELIZABETH S. VARTKESSIAN, CAPITAL JURY PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE (on file 
with Author). This survey instrument is personally maintained and on file with the 
Author. The instrument asked jurors about their knowledge of the case prior to trial, jury 
selection, recollections and responses to the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty 
phases, accounts of jury deliberations at both guilt and sentencing, their impressions of 
the legal actors, the defendant and the victims and their families, and finally their views 
on the criminal justice system generally and capital punishment specifically. The 
interviews for the forty-six jurors included in the Texas segment of the CJP research 
lasted between three and eleven hours, averaging just under six hours. 
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II.  Descriptions of the Guilt Phase in Voir Dire 
 
Voir dire plays a critical role in shaping the mindset of capital 
jurors. It is during this initial stage of the capital trial that potential jurors 
will experience the process of death-qualification and be made aware of 
the fact, if they have not been already, that they might be participating in 
a death penalty case. Death-qualification attempts to ensure that only 
eligible prospective jurors are selected to deliberate in a capital case. In 
order to be eligible for jury service in a capital trial a juror must be able 
to afford the defendant an individual assessment of the punishment he or 
she deserves based on the evidence presented.
47
 Each juror is routinely 
(and often repeatedly) questioned by the judge and attorneys in order to 
assess their capacity to suspend judgment regarding a sentencing 
decision and apply the law in an even-handed manner. Thus, jurors who 
are death-qualified would have been questioned about their ability to 
consider and give a sentence of death or of LWOP to convicted capital 
murderers. Those who are unable or unwilling to sentence someone to 
death are excluded from jury. 
An important outcome of the repeated questioning jurors experience 
during death-qualification is biasing effects regarding the defendant’s 
guilt and punishment. Research indicates that death-qualified jurors, due 
to questioning focused on sentencing concerns, enter the trial tending to 
believe that the defendant is guilty, that he will be convicted of capital 
murder, and that death is likely to be the appropriate sentence.
48
 In fact, 
studies show that jurors who are death-qualified are less likely to be 
persuaded by mitigating factors and more likely to be persuaded by 
aggravating factors.
49
 Death-qualified jurors, therefore, are more 
conviction-oriented and punitive than their excludable counterparts.
50
 In 
addition, extant literature also demonstrates that capital jurors enter the 
trial primed to view the defendant as less than human through extensive 
 
47. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (ruling that jurors who could not 
give effect to mitigation evidence could be struck for cause). 
48. See Haney, supra note 22. 
49. Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror 
Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 152 (1996). 
50. Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death 
Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984). The authors of 
this study conducted a phone survey on a sample of 811 participants who were jury-
eligible. The study distinguished between excludable jurors unwilling to impose a death 
sentence in any case and those who were unwilling to impose a death sentence but able to 
be impartial in determining a defendant’s guilt. See id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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exposure to a wide range of media which portray criminal defendants as 
insane and unfeeling madmen.
51
 Predisposed to view the defendant 
suspiciously and having experienced the process of death-qualification, 
selected jurors will then go on to learn about the centrality of the 
defendant’s future dangerousness in determining their sentence. 
Although there are a number of techniques advanced by the state 
and the defense during voir dire to orient jurors to a particular view of 
the capital trial process and the evidence, below I identify three common 
and especially influential arguments which judges and attorneys for the 
state use and which appear to conflate the guilt and punishment 
decisions. This analysis is limited to judicial and prosecutorial comments 
for several reasons. First, the judicial and prosecutorial remarks given in 
these eight trials were often very similar to one another.
52
 Since jurors 
are more likely to credit the judge’s explanation of the process as valid, 
any alignment between judicial and state comments is likely to be taken 
as fact, whereas comments provided by the defense are more often 
viewed as argument. Likewise, even in trials where the judge did not 
make any remarks to jurors about the sentencing statute, the 
interpretation of the sentencing scheme provided by prosecutors was 
viewed as more legitimate and therefore more persuasive than that given 
by the defense.
53
 Finally, in all trials the defense questioned jurors last. 
As such, by the time the defense had the opportunity to present jurors 
with an alternative perspective of the sentencing statute they had already 
been thoroughly exposed to earlier explanations and were therefore less 
likely to be receptive. 
 
 
 
 
51. Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the 
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 549 (1995). 
52. Vartkessian, supra note 25, at 251-58. 
53. In addition, a review of the trial transcripts show that, on average, the defense in 
the eight trials included in this study engaged in less vigorous questioning than the state 
during jury selection. Jurors were also asked to rate the performance of the defense and 
prosecution on a one-to-ten scale. Jurors answered a number of questions concerning the 
effectiveness of each side’s overall performance, whether jurors thought they were 
prepared for the guilt phase and the penalty phase, whether they thought each side fought 
hard at the guilt and penalty phase, and whether they viewed the team as competent and 
professional. Regardless of trial outcome, the defense received lower average scores in 
every category compared to the prosecution. Defense teams in cases which resulted in a 
sentence of death received the lowest average scores in all categories. 
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A.  Punishment Decision Is the Same as Guilt Determination 
 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a capital 
defendant’s sentence must be based on an individual determination, one 
that is not automatic,
54
 and one that is the result of an inquiry into to the 
moral blameworthiness of the defendant.
55
 In order to fully safeguard the 
distinct nature of the punishment decision it is essential that jurors be 
provided with a clear explanation for how this decision differs from the 
guilt determination. One way that these issues appear to become 
confused is through examples that frame the penalty phase as an 
extension of the guilt phase. For example, the following account was 
provided by a prosecutor to a juror during voir dire: 
 
There are two phases in a case that ends up—criminal 
cases are set up where we call it a bifurcated trial—there 
are two parts to the trial. The first part of the trial focuses 
on whether or not the person committed this crime. And 
so that’s the kind of evidence you hear: evidence to 
prove that he committed this crime when we say he did 
it, the way we say he did it . . . If they vote guilty, 
however, then there is a second phase of the trial, and it 
looks just like the first phase. Both sides get to present 
evidence. You can expect the state to present some 
evidence. The defense may present some evidence. They 
are under no obligation to do so, but they may . . . When 
you couple those two questions with the guilt or not 
guilty question, you know, issue at the first part of the 
trial, you are at three [questions] throughout the entire 
trial. There are a total of three for the entire trial . . . 
The very first question that is answered is guilty or not 
guilty. That’s a threshold question. If that question is 
answered yes, then you answer the second question 
when you get it at the end of the punishment phase.
56
 
 
54. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (holding that death 
sentences imposed under North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
55. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
56. TX04D (emphasis added). All cited transcripts, interview recordings, and 
completed survey instruments are personally maintained in locked files and password-
protected formats. In order to ensure the highest degree of confidentiality the Author uses 
a general citation to the case rather than specifically reference the trial, volume, and page 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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The prosecution in this case draws the juror’s attention to the structural 
similarity between the guilt and penalty phases. Although it is correct 
that each phase might look the same structurally in that each side is 
permitted to present evidence relevant to the question at hand, describing 
the guilt phase and penalty phase as the same is somewhat misleading in 
the absence of further explanation. In particular, the prosecutor 
formulates the guilt decision as the first question the juror will need to 
answer, thereby positioning the penalty phase questions as a logical 
extension of the guilt phase inquiry. As noted in the example, jurors are 
told to think about the entire trial process as a series of factual questions 
which have a “yes” or “no” answer. Again, by explaining the trial in this 
way, jurors are encouraged to view the punishment phase as the same as 
the guilt phase and, therefore, the penalty decision as the same type of 
decision as the guilt determination. By combining the guilt and penalty 
phase decisions in this way, the fundamental difference between the 
types of inquiry involved in the guilt phase (a factual determination) and 
penalty phase (a moral judgment) is lost. 
 
B.  A Capital Offense Is Enough to Prove Dangerousness 
 
Jurors may use the evidence presented throughout the entire trial to 
determine the defendant’s sentence. However, during jury selection 
jurors are regularly told that they can rely solely on the evidence 
presented during the guilt phase in order to determine an answer to the 
future dangerousness question:
57
 
 
So I want everybody to understand what that really 
means. You have found someone guilty, hypothetically, 
of intentionally or knowingly causing the death of “A” 
and in the course of the same criminal transaction 
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of “B” and 
that answer is presumed no unless the state proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt it should be answered yes. 
Now, does that mean that the jury disregards the 
evidence at the first phase of the trial? No. No. In fact, 
 
numbers of transcripts. 
57. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2009) (the facts of the 
offense alone may be sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of future dangerousness at 
the sentencing phase of the capital trial). 
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the jury, when it comes time for punishment and 
answering questions like this, goes back and looks at 
everything that they heard in the first phase of the trial, 
the guilt/innocence phase, where they hear about the 
circumstances of the offense and so forth and any 
additional evidence that they might hear in the 
punishment phase. All right? And the law envisions there 
may be some situations where the facts of the offense are 
such that the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
there’s a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence in the future.
58
 
 
By referencing the guilt phase of the trial and pointing out that the jurors 
may hear enough during that segment of the proceeding to determine the 
defendant’s dangerousness, the judge’s remarks can have the effect of 
merging the two stages. 
Likewise, attorneys for the state stressed that jurors were able to use 
the evidence in the guilt phase as the sole determinant of the defendant’s 
dangerousness. For example in one case during voir dire the state 
explained to a juror how she could use the evidence presented during the 
guilt phase to decide the defendant’s dangerousness: 
 
Q: That the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society. Now, what kinds of 
things do you think would be important to know in answering that 
question? 
A: His criminal background. 
Q: Okay. 
A: Whether he is violent in other areas of his life. If his temper is 
out of control. 
Q: Okay. 
A: How he treats his family. 
Q: Okay. 
A: Things like that. 
Q: Okay. Absolutely. A person’s background could be very 
important. Can you see how the offense itself—might tell you everything 
about a person? 
 
58. TX02D (emphasis added). 
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A: Yeah. 
Q: Now, in this part of the trial you’re asked to look at the evidence, 
kind of reevaluate all the evidence you heard at the guilt phase of the 
trial. Because you know during the first phase of the trial when we 
present evidence— 
A: Right, you’re not getting all the other background. 
Q: —you’re looking at it from, did he do it, did he not do it. Now 
you’re taking everything you heard about the crime itself, plus any 
additional evidence you heard about the defendant’s background and 
now you’re looking at it to determine, you know, what kind of person is 
he? How did he carry out this crime? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: Why did he commit this crime? Was this a stranger-on-stranger 
situation? Or was it—what was the relationship of the party? 
A: Right. 
Q: So those are the kinds of things you would look at, as you 
pointed out, to determine whether or not the defendant is a continuing 
threat to society.
59
 
 
In this instance, the juror is reoriented to think about guilt phase evidence 
as providing evidence of the defendant’s character. Similarly, in another 
trial the prosecutor explained: 
 
Q: And then there’s some folks who say, “No, you know, I 
convicted him of capital murder, but, state, you have to prove to me that 
he’s going to be a future danger.” Okay? 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: Okay? “You have to prove that to me in whatever way that you 
can, and I’m going to wait and see what you have to offer before I will 
answer this question yes.” Do you know which of those two camps you 
might be in? 
A: I’d have to wait and see throughout the trial all that I heard 
enough evidence that this is not just what he’s being tried for, but this is 
a whole pattern— 
Q: Okay. 
A: —of his behavior. 
Q: And let me ask you about that, because the law does say that the 
 
59. TX01D (emphasis added). 
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state is allowed to rely on just the fact of the instant offense. 
A: Right. 
Q: And still—still be going for the death penalty. Meaning that 
someone, for instance, could have nothing but—not even a speeding 
ticket, but they jump up and commit capital murder, and the state can 
still say, “Wait. This person may be someone who needs the death 
penalty just on the facts of this, how brutal it was—the content of the 
crime itself”. Do you agree that there are some crimes that, that you can 
see that occurring, even if there is not a criminal history?
60
 
 
After answering a question about defense evidence presented in the guilt 
phase the prosecutor continued: 
 
Q: Okay. So kind of going back to my question of can you 
imagine—and you don’t have to tell me what you’re imagining, but can 
you imagine in your mind a situation with a capital—of a capital murder 
that falls in any of the categories that we talked about— 
A: Uh-huh. 
Q: —that in your mind is bad enough, essentially, that you could 
find future danger based solely on the facts of that particular offense?
61
 
 
The prosecutor in this trial later explained: 
 
In other words, let’s say you’re—you’re in a trial and the 
defendant doesn’t have a criminal record, per se. I can’t 
show you that they have ever been arrested or not, but I 
can show you a particularly horrific crime. The law says 
that if you believe from that crime this possibility—or 
probability of danger exists, that you can answer that 
question yes. So let’s take it to the next step. They have 
been found guilty of capital murder. You have 
determined from the evidence, whatever it is, maybe it’s 
the crime only, that there’s this probability of future 
dangerousness.
62
 
 
These comments are especially significant since the defendant in this 
 
60. TX03D. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
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particular case did not have a previous criminal record. This argument—
that the evidence of the crime can be used as the sole basis for 
determining an answer to the first special issue question—was advanced 
in all eight trials analyzed and served to indicate to jurors the continuity 
between guilt and penalty decisions. As one juror who determined the 
defendant’s sentence prior to the penalty phase explained: 
 
And I’d already read the sheet about the sentencing 
phase it was on the same document that I told you I 
should have brought [with the special issue questions]. 
So because you knew what the questions were going to 
be basically before you had gotten to the sentencing 
stage you had already seen enough kind of evidence. 
They gave it to us and that [paper] and said — [the 
paper] said to the effect: “Is he a threat to society?” And 
he’s already been a threat to society and there’s no 
reason to believe he wouldn’t continue to be a threat to 
society because he’d broken out of prison several times. 
To me if you found him guilty there was only way you 
could go as far as the sentencing.
63
 
 
This juror described how the judge in his case had provided paper copies 
of the sentencing statute to jurors to review and keep during jury 
selection. The juror explained how he had considered the evidence 
presented in the guilt phase in relation to the sentencing scheme and was 
therefore able to develop the answers to the special issue questions in 
advance of the sentencing phase. Thus, emphasizing jurors’ ability to 
apply guilt phase evidence to their determination of the defendant’s 
future dangerousness renders it extremely difficult for them to make an 
individualized determination of the appropriate sentence. 
 
C.  Mitigation Is an Extension of Dangerousness 
 
Previous research has shown that capital jurors in Texas often 
misunderstand the purpose and scope of mitigation evidence.
64
 This is in 
part due to the explanations provided by the judge, prosecution, and 
defense attorneys in voir dire which fail to make clear the moral decision 
 
63. TX04D (emphasis added). 
64. See generally Vartkessian, supra note 25. 
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jurors are asked to make when determining the defendant’s sentence. In 
addition, given that each special issue question contains words which are 
vague, legal actors advance various interpretations of the sentencing 
scheme. One such interpretation is that for jurors to be able to give 
consideration to mitigating evidence there must be a link or nexus 
between the evidence and the crime.
65
 For instance, in the following 
example the prosecutor simply directs the juror to retrace the guilt phase 
evidence when determining whether there is sufficient mitigating 
evidence in order to sentence the defendant to LWOP: 
 
Notice that [special issue question] number two does not 
have the reasonable doubt standard. It’s a little more 
open-ended. It’s just kind of let’s take one look back at 
the offense, let’s look at what evidence, if any, was 
presented during the punishment phase and let’s see 
what happened.
66
 
 
Similarly, the prosecutor from another trial explained: 
 
Is there some reason to spare his life is what we’re 
asking here [with special issue question number two]. 
And it tells you what to look at in making the 
determination: All the evidence, including the 
circumstances of the offense, which you have already 
considered in the past, the defendant’s character and 
background. You’ve probably looked at that in 
answering is he going to be dangerous in the future, and 
his personal moral culpability.
67
 
 
These comments invite jurors to think about the guilt phase evidence in 
determining the answers to both the future dangerousness and mitigation 
special issue questions well in advance of the penalty phase. The state 
also provides explanations of the term “moral blameworthiness” which 
direct jurors to define this term with respect to consideration of the 
defendant’s role or level of participation in committing the capital crime. 
The prosecutor in one trial simply explained of mitigating evidence: 
 
65. Id. at 268-70. 
66. TX02D, supra note 59 (emphasis added). 
67. TX04D, supra note 57 (emphasis added). 
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It is evidence that a juror might think reduces the moral 
blameworthiness of this defendant. It minimizes his 
role.
68
 
 
Likewise, a prosecutor from another trial commented: 
 
This question is basically telling the jury to look at the 
circumstances of the capital murder itself and any other 
crimes or offenses you may hear about.
69
 
 
In voir dire, the state’s questioning appears to predispose jurors to view 
the defendant as guilty, prepare to sentence him to death, and to consider 
the guilt phase evidence as providing all the reasons necessary to make 
such a determination. Since jurors enter the guilt phase believing that the 
evidence presented is relevant to sentencing, they will begin to view the 
guilt phase evidence not only as evidence about his factual guilt, but also 
about the defendant’s future dangerousness. It is therefore unsurprising 
that jurors will frequently decide the defendant’s sentence prior to the 
penalty phase. 
 
III. Guilt Phase Evidence: The State’s Case Always Supports The 
Defendant’s Dangerousness 
 
It is the job of the state to offer evidence which persuades the jury 
that the capital murder occurred and that the defendant is responsible. As 
such, the evidence presented in the guilt phase regularly includes 
testimony from law enforcement (e.g., first responders, homicide 
detectives), testimony from crime scene experts (concerning subjects 
such as the murder weapon, blood-spatter evidence, ballistics tests), 
testimony from medical examiners, eye-witness testimony, DNA 
evidence, fingerprint analysis, testimony of co-defendants, testimony by 
other inmates in jail to whom the defendant may have confessed, crime 
scene and autopsy photos, family member testimony concerning the 
victim, and video or audio taped interrogations of the defendant.
70
 
 
68. TX07L. 
69. Id. 
70. This list comprises the broad categories of evidence presented to the jury in the 
guilt phases of the eight cases in this study. 
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Although the state must provide such evidence of the crime in order to 
establish the defendant’s guilt, such evidence is also paramount in 
persuading the jury to view the defendant as dangerous. Jurors 
understandably have an immediate emotional response to much of the 
guilt phase evidence. It is the first time they will hear details of the 
murder, listen to witnesses and victims, and observe the person allegedly 
responsible for the commission of the capital crime. Though it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly what kind of evidence is especially formative in 
jurors’ overall assessment of the defendant as dangerous, I briefly 
discuss three areas which appear to create strong emotional reactions 
with respect to jurors’ views of the defendant in the guilt phase: evidence 
about the victim and his or her family, evidence of the crime, and 
observations of the defendant. 
 
A.  Victims and Their Families 
 
In each of the eight cases in this study a victim’s family member or 
loved one identified the victim, provided statements about their last 
contact, or gave testimony regarding their feelings on learning about the 
murder.
71
 Such testimony often occurred during the first day of trial and 
immediately stirred jurors’ emotions. For instance, one juror described 
how testimony by the victim’s wife on the first day of trial moved 
several jurors to tears: 
 
Yes, it was really hard to see the autopsy pictures and to 
listen to [the victim’s family] was torture. There were 
tears some of them when [the victim’s] wife talked about 
how she was called to the hospital and all that. I mean it 
was hard. Even some the guys were crying—I mean not 
like bawling, but tears running down their faces and 
sniffling. Yeah, it was tough—real hard. We started off 
that way the very first day.
72
 
 
In another trial, moving evidence was given by the victim’s step-father 
 
71. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Victim impact testimony is permitted 
in the punishment phase, but not in the guilt phase. Nevertheless, testimony given by 
family members at this stage, while not strictly characterized as such, will frequently 
illustrate their pain and suffering and thus will have an impact on the jury’s punishment 
decision. 
72. TX05L.  
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about discovering the victim lying in a pool of blood on the kitchen floor. 
Jurors recalled the emotional impact of his testimony during the guilt 
phase: 
 
Most of the girls, we kind of had a hard time with [the 
step-father’s testimony]. I think that there was even a 
couple of guys that walked out of there a little teary-
eyed. We had a bathroom right there and all three of us 
were sitting in our own stalls, well [another female juror] 
and I were sitting in our own stall just crying like little 
two year olds . . . I mean the mom was hard to watch but 
at least she, you know, was a little put together, but the 
dad, he was just crazy, it was like “Look what you did to 
my baby. I was supposed to be able to protect her and I 
couldn’t protect her against this.” I think that’s when 
they were asking questions like what did this do to your 
family and because the father was the one that came in 
the door and found her they had to put him up there.
73
 
 
Although the relevance of the step-father’s testimony in relation to the 
defendant’s guilt was in establishing a time-line of events, jurors recalled 
little of his testimony beyond the emotional impact of his presentation 
and his belief that the defendant had committed the crime. As the above 
juror described, aspects of the step-father’s testimony noticeably 
departed from evidence strictly related to issues regarding the 
defendant’s guilt—specifically his comments about failing to protect his 
daughter. These types of comments, as well as the physical discomfort 
displayed by witnesses, are difficult for jurors to separate from what 
relevance their testimony may have in relation to the question of the 
defendant’s guilt. Such displays of raw emotion reveal the palpable 
suffering of the victim’s family at the outset of the trial and serve to 
distract jurors from evidence strictly related to an assessment of guilt. 
 
B.  Crime Scene Photos 
 
In addition to testimony provided by victims’ family and friends, 
each trial included the presentation of color photographs of the crime 
 
73. TX03D, supra note 61. 
23
VARTKESSIAN_Formatted_Finalv1 6/27/2012 9:20 AM 
470 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
scene as evidence. Jurors recalled the pictures as “vivid.”74 One juror 
described how such photographic evidence helped the jury to understand 
the brutality of the crime: “I think [seeing the crime scene photos] was 
crucial to see how they suffered. It was just brutal.”75 Though such 
evidence may be necessary to establish that the murder occurred, it also 
has the effect of inflaming jurors’ emotions and shaping their view of the 
defendant as someone capable of acting in the most horrific ways. For 
example, in one trial the victims were shot at close range numerous times 
with an assault weapon which caused a great deal of damage to their 
bodies. One juror described the lasting impression of the photos: 
 
Seeing all of that is tough. Those things don’t disappear. 
Neither do the facts and graphics, they don’t. They’re 
there. They imprint on your mind. They imprint on you. 
You know seeing [the victims] . . . or the blood spatter 
all over the walls—remembering [one victim] crawling 
away on his forearm and being continually shot as I said, 
the pictures of [the other victim] with her breasts blown 
off and the exit wounds, those don’t leave you.76 
 
Research suggests that jurors respond more punitively in cases in which 
they have been exposed to violent images.
77
 Although it is not clear what 
impact the introduction of such photographic evidence had on the 
eventual outcomes in these trials, such emotionally charged evidence 
does elicit powerful responses from jurors who, in turn, perceive a 
defendant as unmoved by the same graphic images. The defendant’s 
response to such evidence may confirm, in their eyes, his guilt, 
remorselessness, and lack of humanity: 
 
[I was convinced of the defendant’s guilt] after I saw—
and it was testified to me—the brutality. The gruesome 
pictures, the smug look on his face afterwards, that told 
 
74. TX02D, supra note 59. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and 
Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006); 
Kevin S. Douglas et al, The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ 
Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485 
(1997). 
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me he was guilty.
78
 
 
Another juror from the same trial commented: 
 
[The defendant] seemed to be real cocky. It was like he 
really thought he was some kind of stud and he was just 
kind of sitting there like “oh, I’m just going to get away 
with this” and it really wasn’t all the time it was just a 
couple of times I caught him doing that and he’d get this 
smile on his face like “yeah, you guys got no clue how 
bad I really am” you know. It was just an impression, 
but he didn’t seem remorseful.79 
 
Jurors appeared to expect the defendant to respond in the same way as 
they did to the crime scene photos. When the defendant did not react 
“appropriately” it confirmed his guilt and even, as the juror alluded to in 
the second quote, his satisfaction at having committed the crime. The 
jurors’ personal responses to the photographs, as well as their 
observations of the defendant’s reactions to the evidence, are therefore 
significant to the guilt decision. After having viewed the photographs, 
jurors begin to form an opinion of the defendant as emotionless, 
inhuman, and dangerous at an early point in the trial. 
 
C. Observations of Witnesses and the Defendant 
 
A number of jurors reported watching the defendant closely 
throughout the trial and were mindful of his non-verbal cues. Jurors often 
perceived a lack of response from the defendant, which they considered 
as evidence of both his guilt and dangerousness. For example, in one trial 
jurors perceived “fear” in the two eye-witnesses to the murder when they 
testified. This became a pivotal factor for determining the defendant’s 
guilt: 
 
The preponderance of the evidence, combined with the 
circumstance, combined with the real and honest fear, 
particularly of [one witness]. [The two eye-witnesses] 
were both very fearful, very afraid, not a little afraid, 
 
78. TX02D, supra note 59. 
79. Id. 
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they were maximum afraid that this guy was going to 
kill them.
80
 
 
The juror above credited the eye-witnesses’ testimony because she 
believed each witness was fearful of the defendant. In fact, the juror 
expressly stated that she found the defendant guilty for two reasons—the 
brutality of the crime and the look on the defendant’s face81—in 
particular, his ability to provoke fear in each witness by simply being 
present in the courtroom. 
Jurors reported scrutinizing the defendant’s body language and 
facial expressions closely throughout the trial, looking for any reaction. 
Despite such attentiveness, significant numbers of jurors believed that 
the defendant exhibited no emotion whatsoever during the course of the 
proceedings (76 percent), indicating him to be cold (57 percent), 
remorseless (78 percent), without a conscience (71 percent),
82
 and 
ultimately dangerousness to other people (91 percent).
83
 
Previous research suggests that jurors are more likely to sentence a 
defendant to death if they think him to be emotionally uninvolved in the 
trial.
84
 Jurors in this study who decided that the defendant was 
emotionally distant during the trial were easily able to relate such a 
conclusion to the defendant’s dangerousness. The use of evidence which 
provokes an emotional reaction from jurors but is unlikely to produce the 
same from a defendant allows the state to influence the jury’s 
consideration of the special issue questions in the guilt phase long before 
the punishment phase has commenced, and often absent any counter 
argument from the defense.
85
 
 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. This question has one missing case (n=45). Percentages listed are valid 
percentages. 
83. Jurors were asked to identify how well the terms described the defendant. The 
percentages listed reflect jurors who responded that the phrase described the defendant 
very well and fairly well. Jurors who selected the option choice of not so well were not 
included in the reported percentages. 
84. Michael E. Antonio, Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty: How the Defendant’s 
Appearance During Trial Influences Capital Juror’s Punishment Decision, 24 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 215 (2006). 
85. See, e.g. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (West 2003). Due to the 
bifurcation of capital trials into two phases the defense is legally unable to present 
evidence regarding the defendant’s background unless it is related to the question of guilt. 
In practice, this means that the defense will often not present a single witness during the 
guilt phase, leaving the jury to focus entirely on the state’s case. With the special issue 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
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IV.  Guilt Deliberations 
 
An overwhelming majority (85 percent) of jurors entered the guilt 
deliberations having already decided the defendant was guilty. Moreover, 
80 percent of jurors had concluded that he was guilty of capital murder. 
Thus, very few jurors entered deliberations undecided (11 percent) or 
believing the defendant to be not guilty of capital murder (4 percent).
86
 
One jury began deliberations by discussing the evidence presented 
during the guilt phase, eventually reaching a consensus about the final 
verdict. However, in the seven remaining trials juries began deliberations 
with an initial vote
87
 in order to gauge individual opinions about the 
defendant’s guilt. As one juror described: 
 
I think we first of all went around the table and 
everybody talked about how they felt about [the 
defendant’s guilt] and whether or not they had made a 
decision, if you were still unsure. If you were sure what 
you were leaning towards. Each person made a comment 
and they discussed it while it was their turn. They 
discussed any and everything they wanted to.
88
 
 
Jurors in each case reported that at least one member of the jury was 
either “undecided” or not quite convinced of the defendant’s guilt at the 
 
questions immediately framing the evidence presented in terms of the defendant’s 
dangerousness, this structural limitation serves to disadvantage the defense. The defense 
called witnesses to give evidence in the guilt phase in three of the eight cases included in 
this study. Two of those three trials ended in sentences of LWOP. 
86. Jurors were asked about their guilt decision after hearing the judge’s 
instructions to the jury, but before they began deliberating with the other jurors. 
87. Juries who conducted initial votes did so in one of three ways. Some juries 
conducted formal votes—either by secret ballot or a show of hands. Other juries went 
around the room, allowing each person to explain their position on guilt. While the 
second, less formal method did not ask jurors to take a firm position on the defendant’s 
guilt immediately, jurors inevitably expressed their opinion providing a de facto vote. 
The single case which did not take a vote began deliberation with a review of evidence 
and discussion of the standards of proof for guilt. Each method is consistent with 
previous research which has classified deliberations in two categories—verdict-driven or 
evidence-driven. See REID HASTIE ET AL, INSIDE THE JURY 163-65 (1983) (verdict-driven 
deliberations begin with a public ballot, are guided by verdict positions of individual 
jurors, and engage in frequent polling. Evidence-driven deliberations are categorized by 
public balloting late in deliberations. Jurors in evidence-driven deliberations are not 
closely associated to a specific verdict). 
88. TX02D, supra note 59. 
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beginning of deliberations. The data indicate that jurors who were in the 
majority helped focus the discussion on factors which would persuade 
those who were undecided. Since each trial involved a majority of jurors 
who believed the defendant to be guilty, this always included an 
extended review of the crime scene photos. As one juror explained: 
 
We actually put [the crime scene photos] up on a board, 
first of all we started a list of things we had questions 
about and tried to eliminate them and or go through them 
. . . We looked at [the male victim] and how he fell and 
moved forward and I think that is when I discovered his 
hand prints in blood where he actually tried to crawl 
away and we don’t know that he ever said anything but 
it appeared he was begging . . . .
89
 
 
The guilt deliberations therefore often involved juries retracing the 
state’s case in some detail and focusing on aggravating factors. Jurors 
regularly inferred specifics from the evidence about what the victim may 
have experienced in their final moments, as the quotation above 
illustrates. Although it is expected that jurors will and should discuss 
issues such as the defendant’s motive, responsibility for the killing, the 
role of an accomplice, the strength of witness testimony, the judge’s 
instructions to the jury, and whether jurors agree on the meaning of the 
standard of proof, much of jurors’ deliberations also focused on topics 
outside of the defendant’s guilt. For instance, jurors reported rampant 
discussions of topics more relevant to the punishment decision than to a 
determination of the defendant’ guilt. For instance, 65 percent of jurors 
reported some discussion during guilt deliberations regarding the 
defendant’s dangerousness if ever allowed back in society. Likewise, 85 
percent of jurors reported some discussion of the defendant’s history of 
crime and violence, 91 percent discussed the pain and suffering of the 
victim, 83 percent discussed the loss and grief of the victim’s family, and 
nearly two-thirds of jurors (65 percent) discussed their feelings about the 
right punishment. 
The emphasis placed by other jurors on the defendant’s 
dangerousness when deliberating on his guilt proved to be especially 
moving to jurors who were undecided. As one initially undecided juror 
described: 
 
89. Id. 
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Q: You said that there were roughly eight people who felt like he 
was guilty and they really didn’t have any questions. So, I want to know 
how they explained to you and the other folks who were still needing a 
little bit of clarification on stuff – what did they say? What were their 
arguments to you? 
A: They were saying, o.k., look at the pictures. Look at the brutality 
of the pictures. The gruesomeness down the line. The fact that he had an 
assault weapon and one [victim] did not have a weapon—one did have a 
weapon. His demeanor. Gosh—there were so many questions—but they 
were proving them—proving them by what they were bringing up.90 
 
Another juror from the same trial commented: 
 
The crime scene photos were asked for to kind of 
reinforce the fact that it wasn’t about this one person [the 
defendant]. It was about these two other people. That in 
my mind was the reason that we asked for those pictures 
to be brought back in. They were horrible and nobody 
wanted to look at them, but it’s like, we’ve got to look to 
remember that these people had lives. They were moving 
on and becoming good members of society. They 
weren’t perfect—like none of us are, but they didn’t 
deserve this bloodbath and it was a bloodbath.
91
 
 
This juror’s observations are evocative of comments more often made by 
jurors when describing the penalty phase—not the guilt phase. The juror 
seems to ignore the intention of the guilt phase, which concerns the 
defendant’s actions and whether he is legally responsible for the crime. 
Instead, she is so moved by the graphic pictures that she focuses on 
holding someone responsible for the terrible crime, rather than making 
an individual determination regarding this particular defendant’s guilt. 
Thus, discussions of the defendant’s dangerousness during guilt 
deliberations can enable jurors to side-step the question of the 
defendant’s guilt. 
Given the tenor of guilt deliberations high numbers of jurors 
reported discussing whether the defendant would be dangerous and what 
 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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punishment they thought he deserved. Although the jury is directed by 
the judge not to discuss the potential punishment during the guilt phase, 
nearly two-thirds of jurors (65 percent) reported some premature 
discussion of the defendant’s punishment, while the same percentage 
also reported discussing the defendant’s dangerousness. As one juror 
explained: 
 
Well, we knew though that those questions, if we made a 
decision, how we had to answer those or what we would 
have to think about so it did kind of come into part of 
our decision.
92
 
 
Indeed, half of the jurors (50 percent) indicated that during the guilt 
deliberations they even discussed whether the defendant would ever be 
executed. Finally, almost a quarter of jurors (22 percent) reported some 
discussion about how soon the defendant would get out of prison if he 
was not given a sentence of death. This final topic is especially 
interesting given that all cases included in this study were tried after 
LWOP became the sentencing alternative to death. 
Regardless of whether jurors openly discussed the appropriate 
punishment for the defendant, their accounts indicate that much of the 
guilt-phase deliberations were spent discussing evidence and testimony 
which stirred their emotions. These discussions tended to center on the 
jurors’ feelings about the victim, the victim’s family, their observations 
of the defendant, and their feelings towards him. Nearly all of the jurors 
(94 percent) reported discussing the brutal or vile manner of the killing, 
while 91 percent reported some discussion about the suffering of the 
victim. An overwhelming majority of jurors (78 percent) discussed their 
feelings for the family of the victim, while 74 percent discussed their 
feelings toward the defendant. Finally, 87 percent of jurors reported 
some discussion of the defendant’s appearance or manner in court during 
the guilt deliberations. For instance, one juror commented, “We 
discussed that he never blinked. He never showed any sign of remorse.”93 
These conversations appeared to shape jurors’ views about the 
defendant’s character, helping to create a picture of the defendant as 
dangerous and, in some cases, as evil. Thus, even juries who did not 
discuss the defendant’s sentence explicitly were in essence deliberating 
 
92. Id. 
93. TX03D, supra note 61. 
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upon the answer to the first special issue question regarding the 
defendant’s dangerousness before any punishment phase evidence had 
been presented. In fact, many jurors did not recall a difference between 
the future dangerousness question and the mitigation question, indicating 
that discussions which implied that the defendant was dangerous in turn 
served to shape jurors’ understanding of the defendant’s character and 
background. Jurors who both believed the defendant to be dangerous, 
and did not distinguish between the dangerousness and mitigation issues 
were therefore able to determine an answer to both questions prior to the 
presentation of any penalty phase evidence. 
Of particular importance were those occasions when jurors were 
uncertain about the defendant’s guilt. In those instances candid jury 
discussions focused not on delivering a not-guilty verdict, but on the 
appropriate punishment.
94
 Fifteen percent of the jurors in this study 
reported at least one member of their jury as having said they would join 
the majority’s vote to convict the defendant of capital murder, but would 
refuse to impose a sentence of death due to doubts about his guilt.
95
 
Uncertainties about the defendant’s guilt should not result in a lesser 
sentence, but rather in the acquittal of the defendant for the capital 
offense. When jurors decide to convict a defendant of a capital crime 
despite misgivings, it necessarily calls into question the validity of the 
conviction. 
Jurors who negotiated a life sentence for a defendant during guilt 
deliberations used either the special issue question related to the 
 
94. Jurors in this situation did not necessarily believe that the defendant was 
factually innocent, but rather some jurors did not think the offense should have been 
eligible for capital punishment. For instance, in one case the jury believed the defendant 
was present during a burglary-homicide. However, no evidence was presented to confirm 
the defendant was the triggerman. While the jury was convinced the defendant had 
participated in the burglary they were not sure he was responsible for the murder and thus 
did not want to find him guilty of the capital crime. In only one trial was the issue of the 
defendant’s factual innocence raised during guilt deliberations. One member of the jury 
was not convinced the defendant had committed the double murder. That jury eventually 
sentenced the defendant to death. 
95. Jurors were asked whether any member of their jury said they would vote guilty 
of capital murder, but would not vote for a death sentence during guilt deliberations. The 
seven jurors who reported a member of the jury saying that they would vote guilty of 
capital murder but would not vote for the death penalty originated from five trials. Three 
of those trials resulted in a sentence of LWOP while two resulted in sentences of death. 
See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, 
Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L REV. 1557 (1998) (noting that residual 
doubt is a strong mitigating factor in cases with multiple defendants and circumstantial 
evidence). 
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defendant’s participation as a party to the capital murder96 or the 
mitigation special issue question as the statutory mechanism for 
expressing residual doubt about the defendant’s responsibility.97 In three 
of the four cases which resulted in sentences of LWOP members of the 
jury used evidence related to the crime (e.g., the defendant was not 
necessarily the person who shot the victim, the victim’s actions were 
partly to blame for the capital crime, or the defendant didn’t necessarily 
mean to kill the victim) as the reason to spare the defendant’s life. Jurors 
who were leaning towards a life sentence often cited such guilt related 
issues as the reason they believed that the defendant should be given a 
life sentence. 
 
V.  Premature Punishment Decisions 
 
After going through guilt deliberations that often focus on the 
defendant’s dangerousness, nearly a quarter of jurors (24 percent) 
reported having determined that the defendant should be sentenced to 
death prior to the commencement of the punishment phase. Though 
legally required not to determine the defendant’s penalty before the 
punishment phase starts, with 15 percent having decided he deserved 
LWOP, only 61 percent of jurors reported being undecided at the 
beginning of the penalty phase. 
Perceptions about the defendant’s dangerousness were central to 
jurors’ premature determination of a death sentence. The following juror 
explained why she felt the defendant should be sentenced to death before 
hearing any punishment phase evidence: 
 
Because he was just brutal. He didn’t show any remorse. 
He just seemed like he didn’t value anyone else’s life 
and I just felt that if he were to be let out he’d kill again, 
he’d kill someone else. He just point blank shot, you 
 
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(2) (West 2009) (explaining 
that “in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the jury to 
find the defendant guilty as a party under sections 7.01 and 7.02 of the [Texas] Penal 
Code,” the jury will be instructed to answer “whether the defendant actually caused the 
death of the deceased or did not actually cause the death of the deceased but intended to 
kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human life would be taken.” This special 
issue question follows the dangerousness issue and precedes the mitigation issue). 
97. See Sundby, supra note 96, at 1577. See also Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation 
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1563 
(1998). 
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know, several times and you could see where [the male 
victim] was dragging himself to get away from [the 
defendant] and [the defendant] just kept shooting him 
and the girl too in the car. I mean he just point blank at 
close range just shot her and it wasn’t like he just shot 
them once or twice and ran. He shot them, what, 
twenty—seventeen times? I can’t see anybody just doing 
something like that.
98
 
 
Jurors who decided that the defendant should receive a death sentence 
were thus unable to understand how the defendant could do what they 
believed he did. Given that during jury selection jurors were told that 
they could use the evidence of the crime as the sole factor in answering 
the dangerousness special issue question, jurors did not need to suspend 
their judgment. The nature of the crime and the evidence presented 
during the guilt phase was enough for jurors to determine the defendant’s 
sentence. 
Jurors who made a premature decision to sentence the defendant to 
LWOP also engaged in discussions about the defendant’s dangerousness, 
but made an early determination to sentence him to life due to factors 
related to the commission of the crime. Specifically, a number of such 
jurors had reached the decision to sentence the defendant to LWOP in 
order to go along with the majority verdict at guilt. As the following 
juror expressed: 
 
I gave in that he was guilty because of the way the law’s 
written, but I will not give in that he will have the death 
penalty. Even if he’s dead in there. I’m not going to be 
responsible for actually knowing that he got the death 
penalty.
99
 
 
Other jurors who self-identified as premature deciders for a sentence of 
LWOP did not actually determine the sentence early, but rather 
maintained a clearer understanding of the standard of proof required for a 
defendant to be sentenced to death: 
 
I went into [the penalty phase] expecting a life sentence. 
 
98. TX02D, supra note 59. 
99. TX06L. 
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[The state] had to prove beyond a reasonable [doubt]—
you had to answer all those other questions so you err on 
the side of life until you answer those questions—so to 
me a reasonable person you feel like life is expected 
basically and then you seek the death penalty or imagine 
the death penalty.
100
 
 
Jurors like the one quoted above did not actually determine the 
defendant’s sentence in advance of the punishment phase, but rather 
entered the next part of the trial prepared to hold the state to the correct 
standard of proof before deciding whether a death sentence was 
appropriate. 
Jurors therefore determine the defendant’s sentence prior to the 
penalty phase for several reasons. For one, jurors are induced into 
viewing the trial as a unitary rather than bifurcated proceeding. This 
blurs the distinction between the guilt and punishment decisions. Juror 
experiences during voir dire also often result in a misunderstanding of 
the difference between the future dangerousness special issue question 
and the mitigation special issue question. Since the evidence presented 
during the guilt phase provides jurors with the evidence they often rely 
on to determine the answer to the dangerousness question, jurors who do 
not grasp the distinction between the special issue questions determine an 
answer to both well before the penalty phase. Finally, some jurors 
determined the defendant’s sentence early because they decided to 
convict the defendant of the capital crime despite their misgivings about 
his guilt in return for ensuring he received a life sentence. 
 
VI.  Discussion 
 
Early exposure to the future dangerousness special issue question 
distorts the psychological barriers between culpability and punishment 
decisions thereby encouraging premature sentencing verdicts. It can also 
have biasing effects on jurors’ views of the defendant’s guilt. The early 
exposure to the concept of the defendant’s future dangerousness at jury 
selection followed by evidence of the crime presented in the guilt phase 
will frequently foster fearful responses in jurors. As others have noted, 
the concept of dangerousness cannot be easily divorced from feelings of 
fear because: 
 
100. TX05L supra note 73. 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/8
VARTKESSIAN_Formatted_Finalv1 6/27/2012 9:20 AM 
2012] FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS IN CAPITAL CASES 481 
 
Being afraid implies that the situation at hand is 
perceived as dangerous, regardless of how vague this 
perception may be. It is logically impossible to be afraid 
but not to judge the situation as threatening.
101
 
 
Thus, capital jurors in Texas are told they will need to think about the 
defendant as a potentially dangerous person and are presented evidence 
that engenders fear. This makes it easier to view the defendant as guilty 
and easier to vote for his death. Early exposure to the future 
dangerousness special issue question widens the chasm between the 
defendant and the juror, which is significant hurdle for the defense to 
overcome. This chasm or “empathic divide” as Haney refers to it, can be 
understood as: 
 
[T]he cognitive and emotional distance between [jurors 
and the defendant] that makes genuine understanding 
and insight into the role of social history and context in 
shaping a capital defendant’s life course so difficult to 
acquire. The recognition of basic human commonality – 
an opportunity for capital jurors to connect themselves to 
the defendant through familiar experiences, common 
moral dilemmas, and recognizable human tragedies – is 
the starting point for compassionate justice. But the 
empathic divide stands in the way of that kind of 
understanding. Its roots are deep but not difficult to 
trace. Precisely because the harm for which the 
defendant has been held responsible is so great, and the 
typical capital defendant is perceived by jurors as truly 
different from themselves (made so by his behavior if 
nothing else), there is always a gap in understanding that 
must be overcome.
102
 
 
Thus, by channeling the sentencing decision through a determination of 
the defendant’s future dangerousness jurors are less likely to engage in a 
 
101. Ute Gabriel & Werner Greve, The Psychology of Fear of Crime: Conceptual 
and Methodological Perspectives, 43 Brit. J. CRIMINOLOGY 600, 602 (2003). 
102. Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical 
Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1582 
(2004). 
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reasoned moral decision because they are placed in a situation in which 
they cannot assess the defendant’s penalty neutrally. 
The Supreme Court has held that the dangerousness special issue 
question is constitutional, because it asks the jury to make a routine 
consideration when determining the defendant’s sentence.103 But, as the 
data presented in this Article indicate, jurors often base their decision 
regarding dangerousness on emotionally-charged evidence presented 
during the guilt phase, in violation of the constitutional mandate that they 
suspend their penalty decision until after they have found the defendant 
guilty. Therefore, the issue to be addressed is not necessarily whether 
jurors are making a routine decision often formulated by other actors 
within the criminal justice system.
104
 Instead it is this: how are jurors 
determining an answer to the dangerousness special issue question and at 
what point in the trial? 
The Court has yet to decide whether the inclusion of the future 
dangerousness special issue question and its presentation to the jury 
during voir dire undermines both the presumption of innocence during 
the culpability phase and the requirement that jurors determine the 
defendant’s penalty in a separate hearing after the guilt phase. The 
Court’s decision in Deck v. Missouri105 however provides a line of 
reasoning which could apply to this issue. In Deck, the Court discussed 
how observing a shackled capital defendant can prematurely persuade 
the jury to view the defendant as dangerous. The Court explained: 
 
It also almost inevitably adversely affects the jury’s 
perception of the character of the defendant. And it 
thereby inevitably undermines the jury’s ability to weigh 
accurately all relevant considerations — considerations 
 
103. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“Indeed, prediction of future 
criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our 
criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, 
must often turn on a judge's prediction of the defendant's future conduct. Any sentencing 
authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in 
the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, 
these same predictions must be made by parole authorities.”) 
104. Indeed, commentators have likened determinations of future dangerousness in 
Texas capital cases to modern fortune telling: “[P]sychiatric predictions based on 
hypothetical situations sometimes bear more resemblance to medieval fortune-telling 
than to modern scientific techniques.” TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 45 (2000), available at 
http://02f2fd4.netsolhost.com/tds/images/publications/Chap3.pdf. 
105. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
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that are often unquantifiable and elusive—when it 
determines whether a defendant deserves death. In these 
ways, the use of shackles can be a “thumb [on] death’s 
side of the scale.”106 
 
The Court concluded that a defendant’s due process rights were violated 
when such security measures were taken without adequate cause. As 
with the shackles at issue in Deck, emphasizing the future dangerousness 
issue during jury selection prejudices the jury and undermines the capital 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Moreover, because jurors are told that 
they can rely solely on the culpability evidence to make a future 
dangerousness determination, the bifurcation of the trial fails to perform 
the function envisioned by the Supreme Court in Gregg and its progeny. 
When the United States Supreme Court sanctioned guided-discretion 
models as a constitutional form of capital punishment, it acted on the 
assumption that structural changes to the capital trial could counteract the 
inherent randomness thought to exist in discretionary capital 
sentencing.
107
 The Court placed great weight on the premise that 
bifurcation of the trial into two distinct phases would help sentencers 
separate their guilt and punishment decisions. As the Court observed in 
Gregg v. Georgia: 
 
As a general proposition these concerns are best met by 
a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at 
which the sentencing authority is appraised of the 
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and 
provided with standards to guide its use of the 
information.
108
 
 
Any system which invites and encourages jurors to focus prematurely on 
sentencing issues undermines this constitutional requirement. Thus, the 
Texas capital punishment system appears to fail the most fundamental 
tests of constitutionality. 
Moreover, we have also observed that jurors tend to base their belief 
 
106. Id. at 633 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sochor v. Florida, 
504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992)). 
107. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 
248-51 (1976) (laying out the mitigating and aggravating factors to be weighed in a jury 
determination); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-73 (1976). 
108. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196. 
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about the defendant’s dangerousness on evidence which is extremely 
unlikely to result in accurate future predictions of dangerousness. 
Although not fully developed here, it appears that the inclusion of the 
future dangerousness special issue question further undermines the 
morally principled decision jurors are asked to make by introducing a 
fundamentally subjective standard as a factual determination. Jurors are 
led to believe there can be a “right answer” to the dangerousness special 
issue question, when in fact the vast majority of dangerousness 
predictions have been and will continue to be incorrect. 
Research regarding the functioning of the modern death penalty in 
America has identified inherent failures within the system that no amount 
of restructuring or tinkering is likely to eliminate.
109
 Although America’s 
experiment with the death penalty has largely failed, a minority of 
jurisdictions—including a handful of counties in Texas—continue to 
frequently use capital punishment.
110
 Given that Texas is responsible for 
most of the executions and high numbers of death sentences in America, 
the following further suggestions are offered in an effort to bring the 
practices within the state into accord with constitutional requirements. 
The inclusion of the future dangerousness special issue question 
appears to damage the integrity of the bifurcated capital trial and 
therefore ought to be legislatively removed. Although not conclusive, it 
is interesting that during the two-year period from which the sample of 
cases included in this study was drawn, not a single juror answered “no” 
to the future dangerousness special issue question.
111
 Given that there is 
likely to be little variation in jurors’ beliefs about capital defendant’s 
dangerousness it appears that the future dangerousness special issue 
question fails to significantly further narrow death eligibility for the vast 
majority of capital defendants.
112
 Since the Texas statute already narrows 
 
109. See generally AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION, 
(James R. Acker et al. 2d ed. 1998). 
110. GARLAND, supra note 42, at 40-42; James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, 
Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
(forthcoming) (on file with Author). 
111. The sample was drawn between 2006 and 2008. During that time, seventeen 
capital trials were conducted. One resulted in a hung jury at the guilt phase, four resulted 
in sentences of LWOP, and the remaining twelve cases resulted in death sentences. Of the 
four cases to result in LWOP three did on the mitigation special issue question, while one 
did on the criminal liability question related to the defendant’s participation in the capital 
murder. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (West 2011). 
112. Although rare, there have been cases in which the jury has returned a life 
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the class of defendants eligible to receive the death penalty by 
identifying particular types of aggravated murder which render a 
defendant death-eligible, no further narrowing is required.
113
 In other 
words, the removal of the future dangerousness issue would not strip the 
Texas statute of the constitutional requirement to limit the application of 
the death penalty.
114
 
However, the removal of the future dangerousness special issue 
question can only be recommended if other modifications to the Texas 
statute were undertaken. The mitigation special issue question, even if it 
were to stand alone, is fraught with ambiguity making it difficult for 
jurors to understand. For instance, if the future dangerousness special 
issue question was removed and the mitigation special issue question 
remained, jurors would continue to be confused by the concept of the 
defendant’s moral blameworthiness. Absent a clearer articulation about 
how the guilt and penalty phase determinations differ, the lower standard 
of proof for finding mitigation, that jurors need not be unanimous about 
the mitigation question or in fact even in agreement about what factors 
they consider to be mitigating, and that LWOP will result if the jury 
cannot reach a decision, jurors will continue to fail in their attempts to 
follow the law. 
Yet, the problem identified throughout this Article extends beyond 
the future dangerousness issue. Because capital jurors go through the 
process of death-qualification and are told in advance of the penalty 
phase to think of a time when they might have to decide if the defendant 
should be sentenced to death, evidence presented in the guilt phase will 
always be relevant to sentencing, regardless of whether it is channeled 
through the future dangerousness special issue question. In some ways 
then, the analysis undertaken here serves to underscore how the future 
dangerousness special issue question expands the malevolent effects of 
death-qualification. Experts have offered a couple of solutions to the 
problems created by bifurcation. One suggestion is to empanel a jury that 
 
verdict after determining the defendant not to be a future danger. See Jury Instructions, 
Texas v. Estrada, No. 2008-CR-5290 (Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2010); Jury Instructions, Texas v. 
Segura, No. 07-10058, (Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2009); Jury Instructions, Texas v. Garcia, No. 
04-9000606 (Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2008). 
113. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 2011). 
114. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (1976) (death penalty cannot be imposed in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner). Cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) 
(Florida examines eight different aggravating factors in their determination of death 
penalty applicability). See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (individualized 
sentencing requires the evaluation of mitigating factors). 
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is not death-qualified to determine guilt, then, if the defendant is found 
guilty, empanel a second separate death-qualified jury to determine 
punishment. Although this might appear to alleviate some of the 
shortcomings of bifurcation this method would prevent the defendant 
from benefiting from highly persuasive mitigating evidence related to the 
crime such as residual doubt. A second suggestion is to impanel a non-
death-qualified jury with the maximum number of alternates. If the jury 
finds the defendant guilty they will be death-qualified after the guilt 
phase but before the presentation of penalty phase evidence. Although 
this second method allows for the jury to hear potentially relevant 
mitigating evidence related to the crime, it risks empaneling jurors who 
are committed to sentencing the defendant to death in the particular trial, 
as opposed to death-qualifying a juror generally.
115
  
At a minimum, steps should also be taken to limit the amount of 
repeated exposure the jury receives to the future dangerousness special 
issue question during voir dire. Although death-qualification permits the 
questioning of jurors about their ability to determine answers to the 
special issue questions, arguments that emphasize the ability of the guilt 
phase evidence to determine an answer to the future dangerousness 
special issue question do little to clarify the distinct nature of the jury’s 
sentencing decision. Rather, such arguments compel jurors to 
contemplate punishment during the guilt phase. If the dangerousness 
special issue question remains, judges should limit attorney arguments 
regarding the applicability of guilt phase evidence to the determination of 
the defendant’s future dangerousness to the penalty phase. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
By providing jurors with the concept of dangerousness as the central 
focus for their sentencing decision, dangerousness permeates how jurors 
perceive the defendant. These data indicate that an overwhelming 
number of jurors make their decision concerning the defendant’s 
punishment before any penalty phase evidence is presented. Thus, the 
statutory emphasis on the defendant’s dangerousness, which has been 
exhaustively discussed during jury selection and reinforced by the 
evidence presented in the guilt phase, facilitates premature decision-
 
115. Richard Salgado, Note, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a 
Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 519 (2005). 
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making. 
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the constitutional significance 
of providing a capital defendant an individualized sentence 
determination. However, the experiences of jurors during voir dire 
appear to confuse the purpose of bifurcation and frustrate efforts to limit 
arbitrariness in sentencing. Yet as the law stands, death-qualification will 
remain part of any capital trial, meaning that every juror will know the 
precise scope of the sentencing scheme prior to the start of the guilt 
phase. Courts must recognize that the inclusion of the future 
dangerousness question in the Texas statute has particularly deleterious 
effects on jurors’ ability to distinguish between the two phases of the 
trial. 
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